While the government transition has exposed underlying tensions, it also presents an opportunity for both nations to redefine their relationship on more equitable and inclusive terms.
Bangladesh and India share a complex relationship characterized by historical camaraderie and recurring tensions. This intricate interplay of cooperation and conflict has been further strained since the political transition in Bangladesh on August 5, 2024, which saw the departure of Sheikh Hasina from power. Her exit, followed by the rise of an interim government under Professor Muhammad Yunus, disrupted the longstanding alignment between India and the ruling Awami League, casting uncertainty over the bilateral relationship.
Recent developments, including the arrest of Chinmoy Roy, a former ISKCON leader in Bangladesh, have only added fuel to an already volatile situation. Accusations of sedition and attacks on diplomatic properties have escalated tensions, bringing into sharp focus the fragility of ties between these two neighbors.
India has traditionally maintained a close relationship with Bangladesh’s Awami League, given its instrumental role in the 1971 Liberation War and subsequent governance of the country. Over the decades, this alignment, while beneficial in securing strategic interests, has alienated other political factions and sections of the Bangladeshi populace. Hasina’s prolonged tenure further solidified India’s influence but also heightened perceptions of Indian favoritism toward a single political entity. With Hasina’s ouster, India faces not just the loss of a reliable partner but also the challenge of rebuilding trust with an interim government seeking to assert its independence. This dynamic has been exacerbated by growing anti-India sentiments within Bangladesh, fueled by unresolved bilateral issues and perceptions of interference in domestic politics.
The arrest of Chinmoy Roy, coupled with India’s concerns over the safety of minorities in Bangladesh, sparked a diplomatic standoff. India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s visit to Dhaka aimed to address these concerns, but his discussions with Bangladeshi officials highlighted the deep-seated grievances on both sides. Bangladesh, while acknowledging India’s concerns about minority rights, emphasized the inappropriateness of external commentary on its internal matters. Statements from the interim government underscored a clear message: Bangladesh expects reciprocal respect for sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. This firm stance reflects a shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy approach, signaling a desire to redefine its relationship with India beyond the parameters set during Hasina’s rule.
Underlying these diplomatic skirmishes are long-standing unresolved issues that continue to strain bilateral relations. Border killings remain a deeply contentious matter, with frequent incidents along the Bangladesh-India border creating resentment among the Bangladeshi population. Despite repeated assurances, progress on the Teesta water-sharing agreement has been elusive, further aggravating public opinion in Bangladesh. These failures, coupled with trade imbalances and non-tariff barriers, have contributed to a perception of neglect on India’s part. This has allowed anti-India narratives to gain traction, particularly among opposition groups and grassroots movements. The rise of such sentiments was most evident during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s controversial visit to Dhaka in 2021, which triggered violent protests and left a lasting impact on the bilateral relationship.
The interim government’s posture also reflects broader shifts in Bangladesh’s domestic politics. The alienation of political parties other than the Awami League during India’s engagements has fostered a sense of exclusion and resentment. The opposition’s cautious embrace of anti-India rhetoric, as seen in campaigns like “India Out,” underscores the growing divergence between public sentiment and India’s historical strategy of aligning with specific political entities. Even during the July Revolution, slogans like “Delhi or Dhaka: Dhaka, Dhaka” were chanted on the street. While these campaigns have largely remained on the fringes, their resonance among certain sections of the population reflects deeper discontent over India’s perceived dominance in the bilateral relationship.
India’s own domestic policies have further complicated matters. The rise of ethnonationalism and the marginalization of Muslims in Indian politics have not gone unnoticed in Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority country with a deeply rooted sense of cultural and religious identity. Incidents of communal violence and discriminatory policies in India have fueled anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh, undermining the goodwill cultivated during the early years of the bilateral relationship. The dehumanization of Muslims in India’s political discourse has also had ripple effects across the border, straining the social and cultural ties that bind the two nations.
The current diplomatic impasse underscores the need for a recalibration of the relationship. India must recognize that its long-standing reliance on the Awami League has alienated significant segments of Bangladesh’s polity. A broader engagement strategy that includes opposition parties, civil society, and grassroots organizations is essential to rebuild trust and foster a more inclusive relationship. Resolving contentious issues such as border killings and water-sharing agreements would demonstrate India’s commitment to equitable and fair dealings with Bangladesh. These steps would not only address immediate grievances but also lay the groundwork for a more resilient and sustainable partnership.
Equally important is India’s domestic policy. Adopting more inclusive and pluralistic approaches toward its Muslim population would help mitigate anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh and reinforce its image as a regional leader committed to harmony and diversity. This shift would require not just policy changes but also a reorientation of India’s broader political narrative, which has often prioritized majoritarian interests at the expense of regional and communal cohesion.
For Bangladesh, the interim government must navigate the delicate balance of asserting its sovereignty while maintaining constructive engagement with India. Addressing India’s concerns about minority rights, while ensuring justice for attacks on religious and cultural sites, would strengthen its moral authority and demonstrate its commitment to mutual respect. The interim government must also avoid rhetoric or actions that could escalate tensions, focusing instead on fostering dialogue and addressing bilateral issues constructively.
The way forward lies in mutual recognition of shared interests and the complexities of the bilateral relationship. Bangladesh and India are bound by history, culture, and geography, making cooperation not just desirable but necessary. Both nations must prioritize resolving contentious issues and building trust, focusing on areas of mutual benefit such as trade, energy cooperation, and climate change mitigation. This approach would not only stabilize the relationship but also unlock the potential for greater collaboration in regional and global forums.
The fall of Sheikh Hasina has undoubtedly altered the dynamics of Bangladesh-India relations. While the transition has exposed underlying tensions, it also presents an opportunity for both nations to redefine their relationship on more equitable and inclusive terms. By addressing historical grievances and embracing a forward-looking approach, Bangladesh and India can move beyond the current impasse and work toward a future characterized by mutual respect, cooperation, and shared prosperity. The stakes are high, but so too are the rewards of a stable and constructive partnership between these two neighboring nations.
